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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah .. 
EARL W. WILSO·N, doing business as 
WILSON'S USED c;ARS, and 
HARTFORD ACCIDENT & IN-
DEMNITY CO·MP ANY, 
Plaimtiff s, 
vs. 
THE INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UTAH, ROBERTA BARNEY, 
..... 
a.widow and BEVERLY BARNEY, 





DEFENbANT 'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
1 L ~TlN\>. VERNON, Attorney Gen. F .dlE~ORENSEN, ~ss't. Att .. G~n. 
jU·Oo .. ; #~~eys fo'r 'the Indrustn.al C.ommtSswn 
------~--DA-V-If~EWTS ·-cl.ER~<, ~.o:-r:.•ilt~B~ey ?a?" RobeJrta and Beverly BMney 
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IN THE SUPREME COURT 
of the State of Utah 
EARL \\~. \\~ILSOX, doing business a.s 
\\~ILSON 'S USED CARS, and 




THE IXDUSTRIAL COMMISSION 
OF UT_AH, ROBERTA BARNEY, 
a widow and BEVERLY BARNEY, 





DEFENDANT'S PETITION FOR REHEARING 
Come now the Industrial Commission of Utah, Ro-
berta Barney, a wi~ow, and Beverly Barney, minor 
daughter of Frank Barney, deceased, the defendants 
in the above cause, and respectfully 'petition this Honor-
able Court for a rehearing in the above entitled cas,e, 
and they request the court to vacate and set aside the 
order and judgment of this court herein annulling the 
award of the Industrial Commission of Utah heretofore 
made. 
This petition is based .upon the following grounds: 
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The court erred in holding that the deceased, Frank 
Barney, did not die from injuries arising out of or in the 
. course of his employment. 
Accompanying this petition and filed herewith is a 
brief of the point and authorities in support thereof. 
WHEREFORE, your petitioners, having filed this 
petition for rehearing within the tim·e allowed by the 
rules of this court for filing the same, pray that it be 
·granted a rehearing of the cause and that the matter be 
set ·down before the court for further argument, and 
~that the matter set forth in this petition and in the brief 
following he given th~ full consideration of the court, 
and that upon such hearing the court set aside and vacate 
its judgment and decision filed herein, and that it enter a 
judgment affirming and upholding the award of the In-
dustrial Commission of Utah heretofore made by said 
Commission. 
CLINTON D. VERNON, Attorney Gen. 
ALLEN B. SOREN,S:EN, Ass 't. Att. Gen. 
Attorneys for the Indust~a.l Commission 
DAVID T. LEWIS 
Attorney for Robert;a and Beverly B1arney 
I hereby certify that I am one of the attorneys for 
the defendants, the 'petitioners herein, and that in my 
opinion there is good cause to believe the judgment ob-
jected to is :erroneous and the ·case should ·he re-examined 
as prayed for in said petition, and that said petition is 
w:ell taken in point o£ law and in fact, and that the same 
is not imposed for the p·urpose of delay. 
CLINTON D. VERNON · 
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BRIEF IN SlTPPORT OF PETITION 
FOR. REHEARINCt 
Inasn1uch as the deeision in this ease has been 
reached by a bare n1ajority of the rourt, and if alh>\VPd 
to stand \vill practically abrograte the long established 
doctrine of ··special n1ission'' in compensation cases, 
\Ye feel it our duty to file this petition for rehearing. 
\V. e feel, and representatives of insurance rarriers gloat-
ingly agree, that if the record here does not establish 
a ''special n1ission' ', recovery of compensation under 
this doctrine \vill hereafter be next to im~possible. Con-
sequently, we most earnestly urge the court to re-examine 
the record, not only for· the benefit of the \vidow and 
child who would be the recipients of this award, but for 
the benefit of the multitude of workn1en who will here-
after be injured and killed under like circumstances. 
This case presents ~o conflict in the evidence. The 
only evidence in the record upon the matters herein 
presented is the testimony of Wilson, the ·employer. The 
facts as told by Wilson are undisputed and clear, but we 
feel, clouded by unwarranted innuendos and inferences 
that opposing counsel has woven into the argument and 
\vhich the prevailing opinion seems to take as factually 
true. 
Earl Wilson, the employer, was a dealer in used cars 
with locations in Salt Lake, Ogden and Phoenix, Arizona 
(Tr. 39). In January 1947 he opened an additional loca-
tion in Magna, Utah, and on January 6, 1947 he employed 
the deceased, Frank Barney, as a foreman and mechanic 
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and assig,ned to him the duty of getting the new ~iagna 
"location. started. ·On Monday, Tu:esday and Wednesday 
' ' 
of the week of January 6th, Barney p·erformed this as. 
·Signment. B·y. w.ednesday evenilng the assignment of 
setting ~t:he M agvna location· up w~as· oo"ni(ple{ed. The em-
ployer so' testified and it' is undisputed. 
'' Q. (Referring to the time of death •the morning 
of January 9th.) He'had eompleted his ·work 
at M.a~a, so far as setting up the shop~ 
A'. Yes. ' ' ( Tr. 60. ) · 
Having completed his first a~signment on January 
8th, Barney w~rrt to the home of his employer on that 
~~·eni~g: t~·· so 'rep<?rt and to ask for his orders for the 
next day, January 9th. There is absolutely no dispute 
as to what those orders were. The employer directed 
Barney to go to M:ag;lla, pick up a certain automobile 
and bring it back to '8alt Lake and then work the re-
mainder of the day in Salt Lake. Despite opposing coun-
sel's · ~®gthy. inferences of other and different orders, 
the record is not open to doubt. Wilson; the employer, 
repeatedly testified as to the exact orders, both on 
direct and cross-examination. There is no .athe.r eviden;Ce 







Was that a telephone conversation~ 
No. He just came to my place for orders. 
What .. orders did you give him~ 
I ordered him to go to Magna and bring in 
a car we ha:d out ~there, bring it to Salt Lake. 
You ordereq him to prq·ceed. to M:agna to 
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Q. Did you tell hirn ho'v to g-et to l\1ag;na ~ 
A. X o. I left that up for hiln. I gave him the 
orders, and it 'vas up to him ~to get it in. 
Q. Now ordinarily how would he have gone to 
Magna on that rnorning·? 
.. A.. Ordinarily he would go in his own car or 
one of mine." (Tr. 40.) 
Later on Wilson again testified. 
· ~ Q. Did you give ~Ir. Barney orders each night 
for the next day's work~ 
.A ... No. 
Q. But you did upon this particular occasion 
tell him specifically what to do~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Had he on p~rior occasions taken the Com-
pany car to Magna~ 
A. No. 
Q. The wrecker~ 
A. If he needed ~the wrecker he would take it.'' 
(Tr. 54.) 
Still later, upon being questioned by the Commis-
sioner, the employer, Wilson, testified at length concern-
ing the whole matter. 
'' Q. Where did Mr. Barney live while he was em-
ployed by you~ 
A. He lived down at his place down on Major 
Street. 
Q. When you told him the night before the acci-
dent to go out and bring in this car, how did 
you understand he would get it~ 
A. It was up to him. He always arranged that. 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q. · Your . ins'tructions were to him to go out and 
bring in this car that you had brought down 
from Ogden~ 
A~ Yes. 
Q. Did you tell him when to bring it in? 
A. Yes, supposed to be in by noon. 
Q. That day~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. So far as you were concerned, it didn't make 
any difference how he would get it, hut you 
wanted it in by noon~ 
-A. As ne.ar as he could get it. 
.Q. · Did yo11 have any arrangements as to what 
hours he worked, or was he supposed to go 
to work at any certain time~ 
A. Eight o'clock, that is all. 
Q. It was generally understood he was supposed 
to go to work at eight o'-clock~ 
A. 'Th.atjs right. 
_ Q. · What part of Magna- did you have your shorp 
in~ · 
A. Wi!th the Magna Motors. 
Q. Is that on the Main Street of Magna~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. About the center of town or this side or the 
other side~ 
A. -Practically in the center. 
Q. What side of the stree't was it on~ 
·· ·A. :North side. 
Q. Do you still maintain a shop there~ 
. A. Yes .. 
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Q. Did i\Ir. Barney have son1e latitude as to 
'vhat he would do and ho"' he arranged his 
"'"ork out there~? 
.. A.. It " .. n.s left up to him. 
Q. He would arrang·e his work pretty much ~to 
suit himself, as long as he got it done~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you have a crew of men working at 
)!agna, mechanics and repairmen~ 
.A... ..A.t this time~ 
Q. Yes. 
A. No, this was a new deal, started there. 
Q. This car brought down from Ogden, was it 
able to operate on its own power, or did it 
have to be towed' 
A. Evidently it would not be in there if it did 
not need repair. All the repairs was done 
in this shop at Magna, and then it would he 
brought in to Salt Lake. 
Q. ~1r. Barney lived in Salt Lake City, and his 
place of work was at Magna, and he was 
supposed to go to Magna each day to go to 
work~ 
A. Yes, and after that if he had a job to pick 
up a car in Ogden or Phoenix, to bring it to 
the sho1;):s. 
Q. This was his work~ 
A. Just s'tarted that new setup·. 
Q. Was he doing any work in Salt Lake~ 
A. No, everything wa8 out there. 
Q. All during this week his duties were specifi-
cally at Magna~ 
A. Started that new setup, started that ar-
rangement, and 'then came in for orders. 
7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
Q~ Did you have any understanding with Mr. 
Barney as to what time he should report for 
work at Magna~ 
A. No. 
Q. Was there any understanding that he could 
start work at noon if he wanted to~ 
A. No. It all dep·ends on whwt the work was 
out there, and what was to be done. 
Q. Did he have any responsibilities for work in 
Salt Lake~ 
A. Y·es. 
. Q. During that week~ 
A. Yes, he would have worked right there, and 
if he got in with the car he would have been 
in Salt Lake that afternoon. 
Q. He would have been in Salt Lake that after-
noon~ 
A. Yes, doing the same thing he 'vas doing out 
there. 
·Q. Did you sometimes use him to repair cars 
in Salt Lake~ 
A. Yes, we have a shop in Salt Lake, and he was 
foreman over that just as well. 
Q. What I am tryilng to arrive at is whether or 
not he had to reporr.t t.a the shop at M.agna 
in ;order t.a commence w.a~rk. 
A. No, there W'as no arrangement that w;ay. 
Q. Where would he report for work that morn-
ing~ 
A. There would not be any work before he got 
his orders. He got his orders the night he-
fore to go to Magna. If he got orders he 
would get them·from Salt Lake. 
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Q. He "Tould get his orders from you, and he 
\Yas directed by yon the night before to go 
and get the rar -~ 
~\. That is righ·t. 
Q. You didn ~t specify any method of transpor-
tation~ 
... \. No, that "~as up to him. 
Q. It \vas up 1.o him~ 
_A_. I didn't need to look after that. He hel1ped 
me that way. 
CO~I. EGAN: That is all." (Tr. 55, 56, 57, 
58 and 59.) 
Having received specifi·c orders from his employer 
to do a specific errand and then return to Salt Lake, 
Barney on the morning of January 9th, proceeded to 
l\fagna and was killed in an automobile accident enroute 
shortly after eight o'clock A.M. The time of death may 
be significant to emphasize the clearness of the fact of 
''special mission''. The employer testified that when 
Barney worked in Salt Lake he began a.t eight o'clock 
A.Jf. at the Salt Lake office (Tr. 54). The witness, 
Foote, a :Jfagna employee of Wilson's, testified thaJt it 
\Vas the rule that he, Foote, should report at Magna at 
eight o'clock A.~L, hut on this particular morning he 
vvas allowing himself a little "leeway" (Tr. 66, 67). Con-
sequently, the sta1tement in the p·revailing 01pinion, page 
3, that the deceased was expected to he at Magna at 
eight o'clock A.M. and that the employer did not change 
Barney's usual hour of departure are not substantiated 
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The prevailing opinion of the court is based upon 
the inference repeatedly made by this court that 
Barney's instructions were to go to Magna, repair the 
car and then come back to Salt Lake. Not one of the 
cour1t's statements below set out can be supported by 
this record. 
''. . . and the evidence indicates the locale 
of Wilson's work was not to be ~hanged until the 
car, later referred to, was repaired and re,t.urned 
to Salt Lake City." (Prevailing opinion page 1.) 
''It (the car) was in need of" repairs and de-
ceased and perhaps other emp[oyees,. were ex-
pected to do the necessary work to fix the car.'' 
(Prevailing opinion page 3.) 
''The car had been taken to Magna for the 
purposes of repair, deceased was charged with 
either repairing 'the car or seeing that it was 
repaired, and it is ohvious that someone had to 
be selected to return the vehicle from Magna. If 
any stpecial errand was suggested by the conversa-
tion, it would be to drive the car from Salt Lake 
when the repairs were finished. If deceased was 
expected 1to perform any of the usual duties of 
his office before leaving Magna with the car, it 
appears that the instruction to r;eturn the auto-
mobile before noon would be in the nature of 
orders to expedite the remaining rep·air work, and 
did in no way vary 1the relationship which had 
previously existed.'' (Prevailing opinion page 3 
and 4.) 
As we have shown by the exc.erpts from Wilson's 
testimony, no mention of repairs was made by the em-
p[oyer to the emp·loyee at all. On the contrary~ Wilson 
10 
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repeatedly testified that on J'annary 8th he did not know 
the sta tns of the repairs on the car. 
'• Q. Did you kno\Y \Yhat the status of the repairs 
on that car \\Ta.s that morning-~ 
... \. I do not. 
Q. So yoll don't kno\Y of your own knowledge 
\Yhether it \\Tas ready to come back to Salt 
Lake or not~ 
.A.. No." (Tr. 46.) 
\\Tilson's unequivocal statement up~on this point was 
later repeated. 
"Q. Whether this work was completed on this car, 
you brought to Salt Lake,. you don't know, do 
you~ 
.A.. No." (Tr. 60) 
Contrasting with Wilson's repeated testimony as to 
his instructions concerning the car and his_ repeated 
denial that he instructed Barney to repair the car, ther_e 
are only two matters in the record· ·that could possibly 
lead the court to the conclusion that the repairing of the 
ear was included in the deceased,'.s instructions. The 
first is a hypothe{ical question asked by opposing c.ounsel. 
'' Q. So if the car that he was supp·os~ed to bring 
in for r~pairs w1as to be worked on, that 
would have to he done first? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Would Mr. Barney have worked on that car~ 
MR .. LEWIS: I object to tha1t a.s incompe-
tent. 
CO·M. EGAN: The owner ought to know. 
MR .. LEWIS : He said at the time he didn't 
know whethe·r i:t has been repaired.'' 
11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
BY MR. DAY: 
'' Q. Suppose this car needed further repairs, 
would he have worked on it~ 
A. Ei1ther him or Mr. Foote would." (Tr. 46, 47.) 
With this testimony we have no quarrel. Of course, if 
the car needed repairs before bringing it to Salt Lake, 
the repair work would necessarily have to he done un-
less the car was towed. There is absolutely no evidence 
that on January 9th the car needed any repairs and all 
argument in 'that regard is tpurely supposition, and an 
affirmative conclusion is totally unwarranted. 
Next is a statement given the insurance company 
by their client, Wilson, but in the handwriting of the in-
surance adjuster, in which Wilson states he told Barney 
";to work on a car." Such a statement, not under oath, 
is surely completely overwhelmed by Wilson's sworn 
testimony at the hearing and completely answered by 
Wilson's sworn testimony that if he made such a state-
ment, ·he was confused (Tr. 47). The fact is, Wilson 
tried to correct the statement later on and long before 
this cont~oversy arose. Counsel would have the court 
believe that Wilson chose to correct his sta.ten1ent after 
consultation with 1the. attorney for the applicant. Such 
an inference is most unf·air and totally unwarranted. 
For, as shown by the record, Mr. Lewis was not em-
ployed by the Barney widow until months after Wilson 
requested to change the wording of his statement. 
The only authori1ty upon which the prevailing 
opinion relies to support the denial of an award in this 
12 
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ea~e 1s Fidelity and Casualty Company vs. Industrial 
Com1nission, 79 Utah 189, S P. 2d 617. But every pertin-
ent fact in the Fidelity and Ca8nalty C\nnpany action 
supporting that decision is exactly opposite to the in-
stant facts. In the Fidelity case the applicant ·was in-
jured thirty minutes before the established tirrie for the 
eommence1nent of his work. In the instant ease Barney 
"·as killed fifteen1ninutes after the time he was to rep·ort 
for w9rk. In the Fidelity case the court states at page 
619 (and relied upon in the instant prevailing opinion}: 
'·If the testimony of Mr. Peck is to be be-
lieved, his employment did =not~ begin until he 
· reached the Semloh Ho·tel. '' · 
But in the instan-t case the emp,loyer testified: 
'' Q. What I am trying to arrive at is wh~ther or 
not he had to report to 1the shop at M:agna 
in order to comm-ence work. ·· · 
A. No, there was no arrangement that way.'' 
(T. 58.) 
We submit tha.t in this case the co·urt must say that 
if the testimony of Wilson is to be be~ieved., the employ-
rnent of B,arney commenced when he left, home, .and the 
testimony of Wi~on must be believed b·ecause t'here· is 
no other evidence. 
And the two cases are further distinguished by 
this very pertinent fact: In the Fidelity case the In-
jured hoy was acting in his usual routine. No special 
orders existed. B~arney w,a,s killed acti.ng unrder extra-
ot:"dinary a;n.d sp~ecial ·orders. 
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The p~revailing opinion states (page 3) that the erne 
ployer did not change any pre-existing course of con-
duct. How ean such a eonclusion possibly be supported? 
The undisputed evidence is that special orders were 
given and had never been given before. 
'' Q. Did you giv.e Mr. Barney orders each night 
for the next day's work~ 
A. No. 
Q. But you did upon this particular occasion tell 
him sp·ecifically what to do 1 
A. Yes." (Tr. 54.) 
And so we submit that the undisputed evidence 
shows that Barney was killed some fifteen minutes after 
his usual time of emp·loyment began and while attempt-
~ng. to fulfill some special orders given to him by his 
emp~loyer the night before. The orders were explicit and 
direct as to what was to be accom:plished. The orders 
were extraordinary and unusual. The deceased could 
have used his ·employer's wrecker to carry out his pur-
pose and !probably would have except that the wrecker 
was itself wrecked on this particular day ( Tr. 41). While 
attempting to further his master's business and in dire~t 
accord with his master's special orders, Barney '\Vas 
killed. We reiterate that no record could more fully 
support a ''special mission''. 
This case has never been orally presented to the 
court, -and in view of the grave injustice we believe ac-
corded the widow and child, together with the extreme 
difficulty of ever again applying the doctrine of '' Rpecial 
1-~ 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
n1ission' \ should the prevailing op1n1on not be recon-
sidered, 'Ye earnestly urge the court to grant a rehear-
Ing. 
Respectfully st1-bmitted, 
CLINTON D. V~RNON, Attorney Gen. 
ALLEN B. SORENSEN, Ass't. Att. Gen. 
Attorneys fior ·t:he Industr:ial C-ommission 
DA .. VID T. LEWIS 
Attorney for Robe;rt;a and B:everly B·arney 
15 
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